Capsule reviews of noteworthy admiralty decisions recently handed down by the federal courts and the Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board —
Cohabitating fiancée was not decedent's "wife" and thus was ineligible to recover death benefits
Welch v. Fugro Geosciences, Incorporated
Benefits Review Board
No. 10-0381; November 24, 2010
In a per curiam Long Shore Decision, the Benefits Review Board addressed in Welch v. Fugro Geosciences, Incorporated the issue whether a claimant qualified as a decedent's surviving widow entitled to death benefits in accordance with provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The decedent, Byron Boswell, was killed in the course of his employment at a time when he was living with his fiancée, Linda Kay Welch. Byron's employer and its workers' compensation carrier paid and settled various compensation claims, at which point Linda pursued recovery of death benefits. Linda argued that she was Byron's "widow" for purposes of LHWCA § 9(b) or, alternatively, that she was an "other dependent" as classified under the Internal Revenue Code. The administrative law judge disagreed and denied death benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed, noting that all pertinent benefits clauses of the LHWCA required that a person be a decedent's "wife" or "husband." Under state law (that of Louisiana), a marriage ceremony was a requirement for a legally-recognized marriage. Linda and Byron never participated in a marriage ceremony, with the result that Linda was not Byron's "wife" at the time of his death, and she was not entitled to death benefits in that capacity. She also did not meet the Internal Revenue Code's definition of a "dependent" of Byron, so that she was not otherwise eligible for benefits on that basis.
No maritime status existed where crew member alleged injury due to unsafe gangway supplied by dock owner
Landers v. Bollinger Amelia Repair, Limited Liability Corporation
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
No. 10-30236 (unpublished decision); December 9, 2010
The Fifth Circuit determined in Landers v. Bollinger Amelia Repair, LLC whether a maritime status arose between a dock owner and a docked vessel's crew member. In this instance, the district court below correctly found that the answer was "no," with the result that there was no admiralty status. Steve Landers was injured by a gangway supplied by Bollinger Amelia Repair (BAR) after the vessel to which he was assigned moored at a BAR dock facility. When Landers brought suit against BAR for negligence under maritime law in failing to provide a safe gangway, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of BAR. The court held that BAR did not have a maritime relationship with Landers, and that any claim under state law already had expired. On appeal, Landers claimed that by requiring docked ships to use BAR's gangways, BAR stepped into the shoes of a vessel owner and therefore assumed a maritime duty to provide a gangway free from hidden defects under general maritime negligence law. The Fifth Circuit rejected that notion, refusing to expand maritime jurisdiction in that way. Instead, the general seaworthiness doctrine is limited to vessel owners and operators, only, and does not extend to dockside repairers. The court also agreed with BAR that where one of its employees played no role in placing or removing the BAR gangway, its policy that docked ships had to use a BAR gangway was the sort of custom the court had found in the past to be insufficient to create a duty in tort. The district court thus did not err in finding an absence of maritime jurisdiction and in applying non-maritime law as a basis to dismiss Landers's claim.
"Last employer" rule in LHWCA multi-employer occupational disease action requires sequential evaluation of employer liability
Albina Engine & Machine v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
No. 09-70592; December 10, 2010
In Albina Engine & Machine v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, the Ninth Circuit considered the "last employer" rule in a multi-employer occupational disease case under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The widow of a worker who had died of mesothelioma due to asbestos exposure filed a claim for benefits against her husband's three maritime employers. Upon trial, Albina Engine & Marine was deemed responsible for payment of benefits. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, admonishing that the BRB had erred in rejecting as irrelevant to the issue of liability, in a multi-employer case, the presumption imposed under LHWCA § 20(a). That presumption provides that, absent substantial evidence to the contrary, a claim for compensation presumably comes within the bounds of LHWCA. The correct analytical approach in a multi-employer occupational disease action, the court said, was to consider sequentially, starting with the last employer: whether the § 20(a) presumption successfully was invoked against that employer; whether the employer rebutted the presumption; and if so, whether a preponderance of evidence supported a finding that the employer was liable for the claimant's injury.
Simple post-judgment interest governs interest calculation on LHWCA past due disability payments
Price v. Stevedoring Services of America, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
No. 08-71719; December 15, 2010
In Price v. Stevedoring Services of America, Inc., the Ninth Circuit decided the discrete issue of how interest on past due disability payments under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is properly calculated. The answer: as simple interest at the federal statutory rate for post-judgment interest payable on district court judgments. After an administrative law judge set an injured worker's average weekly wage and awarded simple interest on past due compensation at the rate set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), the Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed, as did the Ninth Circuit. Section 1961 defined post-judgment interest for purposes of federal judgments, and while it did not apply directly to LHWCA compensation, the BRB had employed the statutory rate for over 25 years. It was a sensible rate to use, the court also reasoned, given that it was market-sensitive, being tied to the one-year U.S. treasury bill rate.
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